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GUILBAUD’S 1952 THEOREM ON THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF
AGGREGATION1
Daniel ECKERT2, Bernard MONJARDET3
résumé – Le théorème de Guilbaud de 1952 sur le problème logique de l’agrégation
Dans un article publié en 1952, peu après la publication du théorème d’impossibilité d’Arrow,
le mathématicien français Georges-Théodule Guilbaud a obtenu un résultat dictatorial pour le
problème logique de l’agrégation, anticipant ainsi la théorie abstraite de l’agrégation et celle de
l’agrégation des jugements. Nous donnons une reconstruction de la preuve du théorème
de Guilbaud, qui présente aussi un intérêt technique, puisqu’elle peut être vue comme le premier
emploi des ultrafiltres en théorie du choix social.
mots-clés – Agrégation, Agrégation des jugements, Connecteurs logiques, Jeu simple,
Ultrafiltre
summary – In a paper published in 1952, shortly after the publication of Arrow’s celebrated
impossibility result, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud has obtained a dicta-
torship result for the logical problem of aggregation, thus anticipating the literature on abstract
aggregation theory and judgment aggregation. We reconstruct the proof of Guilbaud’s theorem,
which is also of technical interest, because it can be seen as the first use of ultrafilters in social
choice theory.
keywords – Aggregation, Judgment aggregation, Logical connectives, Simple game,
Ultrafilter
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1952, one year after the publication of Arrow’s book Social choice and indi-
vidual values, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud (1912-2008)
published a paper called Les théories de l’intérêt général et le problème logique de
l’agrégation (Theories of the general interest and the logical problem of aggrega-
tion4). In our paper we will describe the historical background of this paper that
contained several sharp views on the problem of aggregation [Monjardet, 2010]. But,
we will concentrate on Guilbaud’s logical formalization of this problem and on his
dictatorship result on the aggregation of logically interconnected propositions.
1A first version of this paper was presented at the major conference of the ADRES New
Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories: A Tribute to Maurice Salles, June 10-12,
2009.
2Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Universität Graz, daniel.eckert@uni-graz.at
3Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 and CAMS, EHESS, 54, boulevard
Raspail 75270 Paris cedex 06, Bernard.Monjardet@univ-paris1.fr
4For an unabriged english translation of Guilbaud’s paper see [Guilbaud, 2008], a drastically
abridged translation [Guilbaud, 1966] had remained almost unnoticed [Monjardet, 2008(a)].
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There are at least two reasons to come back to this not enough known material.
First, it appears as the first attempt to build a general abstract theory of aggregation
based here on a logical approach. So, it prefigured works like, one one hand those of
Wilson [1975], Rubinstein and Fishburn [1986] or Leclerc and Monjardet [1994], and,
on the other hand those of the theory of judgment aggregation [List, Puppe, 2009;
List, Polak, 2010]. Second, it appears as the very first application of an ultrafilter
proof strategy to get an Arrovian impossibility theorem. Then, it prefigures the
use of such a proof technique in works like those of Kirman and Sondermann [1972]
or Hansson [1976] in social choice theory [Monjardet 1983] or those more recent
of Gärdenfors [2006], Dietrich and Mongin [2010] (especially for the infinite case),
Herzberg [2008] (for the use of ultraproducts), Daniels and Pacuit [2009] or Klamler
and Eckert [2009] (for a simple proof of a central result) in judgment aggregation.
Unfortunately, Guilbaud gave only what he called an “intuitive” proof of his
main result (571, fn. 1/48, fn. 101)5. In the following two Sections we give a recon-
struction of Guilbaud’s main result and an explicit ultrafilter proof of his theorem.
Indeed, Guilbaud uses only implicitly the concept of ultrafilter for reasons given
in Section 4 where we provide historical details on the genesis of his theorem. In
Section 5 we set this theorem in the context of the recent literature on judgment
aggregation.
2. GUILBAUD’S THEOREM
Explicitly following the algebraic approach to logic underlying modern mathematical
logic (534 ff./23 ff.), Guilbaud formulates the “logical problem of aggregation” in
the algebraic framework of binary valuations of a set of sentences in propositional
logic. In particular, he considers “each individual opinion as a system of judgments,
that is, of affirmations or negations, of acceptances or refusals, of a certain number
of simple propositions” (535/23). Logical connections between these propositions
directly translating into restrictions on the set of admissible valuations (537/25),
Guilbaud identifies the logical problem of aggregation as the problem of finding
a rule which assigns to each profile of individual opinions a logically consistent
“collective opinion”, i.e. an admissible valuation. Thus, Guilbaud’s approach is
entirely consistent with the literature on abstract aggregation theory (see [Wilson,
1975], [Rubinstein, Fishburn, 1986] and, for a survey, [Day, McMorris, 2003]), and
on judgment aggregation (see especially [Dokow, Holzman, 2010]) in the framework
of which it can easily be reconstructed. In fact, Guilbaud can be seen as a precursor
of both strands of literature as we will show in the discussion in Section 5.
Let P = {p1, . . . , pj, . . . , pm} be an indexed set of m sentences in propositional
logic, which constitutes the agenda of the collective decision problem. For simplic-
ity, the agenda will be identified with the index set {1, ..., j, ...,m} of issues and a
proposition pj will be identified with the j-th issue. A valuation of the agenda P
is a map P → {0, 1} which assigns a truth value to any proposition in the agenda.
Algebraically, it is thus a vector x = (x1, ..., xj, ..., xm) ∈ {0, 1}P .
5In (571, fn. 1/48, fn. 101), 571 is the corresponding page in Guilbaud’s [1952] original paper,
48 the corresponding page in its english translation [Guilbaud, 2008], and fn. 1 (respectively, 101)
refers to footnote 1 (respectively, 101).
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Given a set N = {1, ..., i, ..., n} of individuals, a profile is a map N → {0, 1}P
and it is denoted by x = (x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) ∈ ({0, 1}P )N , where, for every i ∈ N ,
xi = (xi
1
, ...xij, ..., x
i
m) is the valuation of P by individual i.
An aggregation rule is then a map f :
(
{0, 1}P
)N
→ {0, 1}P .
Clearly, if the propositions in the agenda are logically interconnected, not all
valuations are admissible (logically consistent). E.g. for an agenda P = {p1, p2}
where p1 implies p2 the valuation (1, 0) is inadmissible. In fact to define logical
connections between the propositions of an agenda P comes back to define the set
X ⊆ {0, 1}P of admissible valuations of the propositions in P . In particular, as is
familiar from the use of truth tables, the sixteen elements of the power set of {0, 1}2
define the sixteen logical connections between two propositions p1 and p2. E.g. the
set X = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} of admissible valuations defines precisely the material
implication p1 → p2.
For a given agenda P , the subdomain of admissible valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}P is
closed under the aggregation rule f if f(XN) ⊆ X, that is if the aggregation rule
does not assign an inadmissible collective valuation to a profile of admissible individ-
ual valuations. Guilbaud calls “Condorcet Effect” (537/25) the fact that a particular
subdomain may not be closed under the aggregation rule. Then, and in particular
under majority voting, the collective outcome may be an inadmissible valuation,
i.e. a valuation which could not have been the opinion of any one (565/44). Thus,
Guilbaud formulates his “logical problem of aggregation” as the problem of identi-
fying those aggregation rules which guarantee closure of relevant subdomains, i.e.
domains that correspond to an agenda of logically interconnected propositions (the
domain X = {0, 1}P corresponding to an agenda of logically completely indepen-
dent propositions being trivially closed under any aggregation rule). In particular,
an aggregation rule is called acceptable by Guilbaud (559/40), if for every agenda
P the corresponding subdomain of admissible valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}P is closed.
Similarly to the social choice literature, Guilbaud stresses the significance of
independence and neutrality conditions for aggregation rules. In fact, he claims that
the collective valuation of any issue should only depend on the individual valuations
of that issue and that this pattern of dependence should be the same for all issues,
a property known as systematicity in the literature on judgment aggregation.
However, unlike Arrow in his formulation of the condition of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, Guilbaud does not justify these invariance properties by the
requirement that the availability of a third alternative should not alter the choice
between any two alternatives but rather justifies the strong condition of system-
aticity by the second order problem of collectively identifying and establishing any
relevant additional information to the individual valuations of a given issue. In Guil-
baud’s view, this implicitly defines new issues and thus, requires the introduction of
additional “’ideal’ voters (. . . ) whose task is to qualify the ballot by their answers”
(569/46).
Let x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N be a profile, j an issue and v ∈ {0, 1} a truth value; the
subset of individuals
xj(v) := {i ∈ N : x
i
j = v}
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is the set of individuals that assign the valuation v to the issue j. Denoting for any
aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P by fj the j-th component of f , i.e. the
function fj : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1} that assigns to any profile of individual valuations
the social valuation of the issue j, the following invariance conditions can be defined.
definition 1. An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is independent if for
any issue j ∈ P , any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and for all profiles x, x
′
∈ ({0, 1}P )N
fj(x) = v ⇒
[
xj(v) = x
′
j(v) ⇒ fj(x
′
) = v
]
.
An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is neutral if for all issues k, l ∈ P ,
fk = fl.
An aggregation rule is systematic if it is independent and neutral, i.e. if for all
issues k, l ∈ P , for all valuations v, v′ ∈ {0, 1}, and for all profiles x, x
′
∈ ({0, 1}P )N
fk(x) = v ⇒
[
xk(v) = x
′
l(v
′) ⇒ fl(x
′
) = v′
]
.
Independence means that the social valuation of any given issue only depends
on the individual valuations of the very same issue. Systematicity makes the further
neutrality requirement that this pattern of dependence be the same for all issues.
Given an aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P , let us say that a subset of
individuals U = xj(v) is a winning coalition for the issue j ∈ P , the valuation
v ∈ {0, 1} and the profile x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N if fj(x) = v. Then, observe that when
the aggregation rule f is independent the set U is also a winning coalition for j,
v and any profile x′ ∈ ({0, 1}P )N such that x′j(v) = xj(v). Thus, an independent
aggregation rule can be characterised by identifying for any issue j ∈ P and any
valuation v ∈ {0, 1} the family Wvj = {U ∈ 2
N : xj(v) = U ⇒ fj(x) = v}, i.e. the
family of all coalitions that are winning for a given issue and a given valuation. One
says that these families of winning coalitions are induced by the aggregation rule f .
Observe that for any issue j ∈ P , the families W1j and W
0
j are co-dual in the
sense that for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1} and any coalition U ∈ 2N , U ∈ Wvj if and
only if N\U /∈ W1−vj .
Systematicity then simply translates into the condition Wvk = W
v
l = W
v for all
issues k, l ∈ P and any given valuation v ∈ {0, 1}. So, when the aggregation rule
f is systematic, there exists two families W0 and W1 of subsets of N such that for
any issue j ∈ P , for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and for any profile x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N ,
fj(x) = v if and only if xj(v) ∈ W
v.
In other words, a winning coalition for a valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. a member of Wv,
is a winning coalition for any issue.
The central part of Guilbaud’s argumentation consists in showing how the ac-
ceptability condition of closure of all the subdomains of admissible valuations under
an aggregation rule translates into conditions on its induced families of winning
coalitions, which ultimately amount to a dictatorship.
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definition 2. An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is dictatorial (or is
a dictatorship) if there exists an individual i ∈ N such that Wvk = W
v
l = {U ∈
2N : i ∈ U} for all issues k, l ∈ P and any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}.
Observe that this definition is equivalent to the usual one in terms of the pro-
jection of the space of profiles on one of its components, i.e. the characteristics of a
particular individual, which then is the dictator
One can now state Guilbaud’s theorem:
theorem 1 (Guilbaud, 1952). A systematic aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N →
{0, 1}P for an agenda with more than a single pair of propositions is acceptable (i.e.
for any X ⊆ {0, 1}P X is closed under f) if and only if it is dictatorial.
We will give Guilbaud’s proof of this theorem below. For his demonstration
Guilbaud establishes and proves several results about the induced families of winning
coalitions. In particular, he establishes the following properties of winning coalitions
for systematic aggregation rules.
definition 3. A coalition U ∈ 2N is efficient if U ∈ W v implies U ∈ W 1−v for
any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. if it is winning for both valuations of any issue.
The fact that the winning coalitions induced by systematic aggregation rule
f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P are efficient means that W0 = W1 = W , i.e. that such
a rule is given for any issue j ∈ P , any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and for any profile
x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N by
fj(x) = v if and only if xj(v) ∈ W .
The other important property of winning coalitions shown by Guilbaud is their
monotonicity property of closure under supersets. Since this property characterises
the families of coalitions known as simple games, it allows Guilbaud to explicitly
apply this concept to the analysis of acceptable systematic aggregation rules6. Guil-
baud shows also other properties – given below – of the simple games induced by
systematic aggregation rules.
definition 4. A simple game on the set N of individuals is a collection W ⊆ 2N
of subsets of N such that for all U, V ∈ 2N ,
if U ∈ W and U ⊂ V , then V ∈ W.
A simple game is proper if for any U ∈ 2N , U ∈ W ⇒ N\U /∈ W.
A simple game is strong if for any U ∈ 2N , U /∈ W ⇒ N\U ∈ W.
Finally, when a (systematic) aggregation rule is defined by a set of (efficient)
winning coalitions forming a proper and strong simple game Guilbaud says that it
is a rule of majority “in the broad sense” (561/41), as it generalizes the partition
6Guilbaud quotes von Neumann and Morgenstern’s [1944] book where simple games are defined.
Observe nevertheless that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s definition corresponds to what is now
called a proper and strong simple game, and excludes what they call the trivial case
where W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for some i ∈ N , i.e. precisely a dictatorial situation.
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of the sets of coalitions into winning and non-winning coalitions that any majority
threshold establishes. Intuitively, this is also the reason for the applicability of the
ultrafilter concept which aims precisely at partitioning a power set into “large” and
“small” subsets.
Guilbaud establishes his theorem with the help of the following lemma:
lemma 1 (Guilbaud, 1952). A systematic aggregation rule is acceptable for any pair
of propositions {k, l} ⊆ P and for any agenda P if and only if it is a rule of majority
in the broad sense, i.e. if there exists a proper and strong simple gameW ⊆ 2N such
that for any issue j ∈ {k, l}, any valuation v ∈ {0, 1} and any profile x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N
fj(x) = v if and only if {i ∈ N : x
i
j = v} ∈ W.
In order to prove this lemma Guilbaud first observes that since the aggregation
rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is systematic, i.e. the function fj : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}
does not depend on the valuation of other issues than j and is the same for each
issue j ∈ P , it is sufficient to consider a single function from {0, 1}N into {0, 1}
which, in a slight abuse of notation, we still denote by f .
Guilbaud proves his lemma by establishing necessary and sufficient conditions
for the preservation of any logical connection between two propositions p1 and p2 by
a systematic aggregation rule. He starts by considering the four logical connectives
which are determined by all the three element subsets of the power set of {0, 1}2.
These are the material implication (for which (1, 0) is inadmissible), the converse
implication (for which (0, 1) is inadmissible), the alternative denial (NAND) and the
disjunction (for which (1, 1) resp. (0, 0) are inadmissible).
Beginning with the material implication, Guilbaud establishes a necessary and
sufficient condition for the preservation of the implication p1 → p2, i.e. the exclusion
of the inadmissible valuation (1, 0). Observe that if the valuation (1, 0) is inadmis-
sible, this implies for all profiles of admissible valuations x ∈ XN = [{0, 1}2\(1, 0)]N
that x
1
(1) = {i ∈ N : xi
1
= 1} ⊆ x
2
(1) = {i ∈ N : xi
2
= 1}.
Thus the exclusion of the inadmissible valuation (1, 0) requires the avoidance
of the following coincidence ("rencontre des deux faits", 558/39) for any profile
x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N
(1) x
1
(1) ⊆ x
2
(1)
(2) f1(x) = 1 and f2(x) = 0, or equivalently, given independence, x1(1) ∈ W
1
and x
2
(0) ∈ W0.
Hence, Guilbaud establishes as a necessary and sufficient condition for the preser-
vation of the implication p1 → p2 the following for all profiles x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N :
If x
1
(1) ∈ W1 and x
2
(0) ∈ W0 then x
1
(1) * x
2
(1),
or, still by independence, and for any coalition W ∈ 2N ,
if W ∈ W1, then W * N\V for all V ∈ W0.
Given the correspondence between logical connectives and sets of admissible
valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}2, it is straightforward to see (559, fn. 1/39, fn. 89) that
to preserve any logical connection between two propositions comes back to satisfy
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the following condition for the exclusion of any valuation {v, v′} ∈ {0, 1}2 in the
corresponding set of inadmissible valuations {0, 1}2\X:
General exclusion condition. For any inadmissible valuation (v, v′) ∈ {0, 1}2
and any profile x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N , if x
1
(v) ∈ Wv and x
2
(v′) ∈ Wv
′
, then x
1
(v) *
x
2
(1− v′),
or, by independence, and for any coalition W ∈ 2N ,
if W ∈ Wv, then W * N\V for all V ∈ Wv
′
.
This exclusion condition is thus a necessary and sufficient condition in order
that a systematic aggregation rule preserves all the logical connections between two
propositions.
The application of this exclusion condition together with other properties readily
establishes the following properties of winning coalitions:
To show that all winning coalitions must be efficient (559 f./40), Guilbaud con-
siders two propositions such that p1 ↔ ¬p2 and the corresponding valuations are
“contradictory”, i.e. x
1
(v) = x
2
(1−v) for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1} and for any profile
x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N . Clearly, by the exclusion condition, if x
1
(v) = x
2
(1− v) ∈ Wv then
N\x
2
(1 − v) /∈ Wv and hence by co-duality x
2
(1 − v) = x
1
(v) ∈ W1−v, i.e. any
winning coalition for a valuation v is also winning for the valuation 1− v.
Guilbaud then proceeds to show that the family W = W1 = W0 of efficient
coalitions is closed under supersets, i.e. that W is a simple game (560/40). This
follows from the exclusion condition by an easy proof by contradiction: Assume to
the contrary that for some winning coalition W ∈ W there exists a superset U of W
which is not a winning coalition (i.e. W ⊂ U , but U /∈ W , and hence N\U ∈ W).
The exclusion condition now requires that N\U * N\W which contradicts the
assumption that W ⊂ U .
Finally, it follows from efficiency together with co-duality that the induced family
of winning coalitions is a strong and proper simple game (561/41).
Now, to show that an acceptable systematic aggregation rule for an agenda with
at least three propositions is dictatorial, it suffices to show that the strong and simple
game W induced by such an aggregation rule has the form W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U}
for some individual i ∈ N – the dictator.
This is done by Guilbaud by identifying an essential condition for the accept-
ability of a systematic aggregation rule, the violation of which is responsible for the
“Condorcet effect”:
definition 5. A collection W ⊆ 2N satisfies the intersecting triple property if
for all U, V,W ∈ W, U ∩ V ∩W 6= ∅.
Observe that this property is equivalent to the condition that the Nakamura
number7 of the collection W be strictly larger than three [Monjardet, 2003].
7The Nakamura number of a collectionW ⊆ 2N of subsets of N is the cardinality of the smallest
subset of W with empty intersection.
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This condition is also intuitively very plausible as its violation directly leads to
the “Condorcet effect”, i.e. to a social outcome that cannot be the valuation of any
single individual because it is inadmissible.
Guilbaud proves his theorem in three steps (565-567/43-45):
(i) The family W of winning coalitions satisfies the intersecting triple property.
Indeed, consider any inadmissible valuation (vk, vl, vm) of three propositions
pk, pl, pm ∈ P . Unless this intersection property holds, one can take three coalitions
with empty intersection and construct a profile such that {xk(vk), xl(vl), xm(vm)} ⊆
W leading to the inadmissible valuation (vk, vl, vm).
(ii) The family W is closed under intersection.
First, by the intersecting triple property, the intersection of any two winning
coalitions is non empty. Now if the intersection of two winning coalitions U, V ∈ W is
not a winning coalition, its complement N\U∩V must be a winning coalition, which
in turn implies the existence of three winning coalitions with empty intersection
U ∩ V ∩ (N\U ∩ V ) = ∅, a contradiction.
iii) The family of winning coalitions has the form W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for some
individual i ∈ N , - the dictator.
Since W is closed under intersection, the intersection
⋂
W∈W
W of all the winning
coalitions is a winning coalition and it is the minimal winning coalition. Assume that⋂
W∈W
W is not a singleton and thus contains a proper subset S ⊂
⋂
W∈W
W . But this
implies N\S ∈ W and hence (
⋂
W∈W
W ) ∩ (N\S) =
⋂
W∈W
(W\S) ∈ W by intersection
closure. Thus,
⋂
W∈W
W cannot be a minimal winning coalition unless it is a singleton,
which completes the proof of dictatorship of any acceptable aggregation rule for an
agenda with at least three propositions.
3. A SIMPLE ULTRAFILTRER PROOF OF GUILBAUD’S THEOREM
Guilbaud’s own proof only implicitly uses the concept of ultrafilter and we will see
in section 4 why he did not explicitly use it. In the following we give an explicit and
simple ultrafilter proof of his theorem. We begin by recalling some definitions.
definition 6. A filter on a set N is a collection W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N such that
(i) N ∈ W and ∅ /∈ W (non-triviality)
(ii) if U ∈ W and V ∈ F then U ∩ V ∈ W (closure under intersection)
(iii) if U ∈ W and U ⊂ V then V ∈ W (closure under supersets).
A filter W on N is a principal filter if it is a collection W = {U ∈ 2N : S ⊆ U}
for some non-empty subset S of N .
An ultrafilter is a maximal filter, i.e. a filter not strictly contained in another filter.
It is clear that on a finite set N every filter is principal and that in particular it
follows that every ultrafilter is a collection W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for some i ∈ N –
which immediately yields a dictatorship result for families of winning coalitions.
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By the monotonicity property of closure under supersets a filter is also a simple
game, which allows to use Monjardet’s [1978] characterization of ultrafilters8 to
obtain the following lemma.
lemma 2 (Monjardet, 2003). If a family W of subsets of a set N is a strong simple
game which satisfies the intersecting triple property, it is an ultrafilter.
This yields a particularly simple ultrafilter proof of Guilbaud’s theorem.
Proof. From Guilbaud’s lemma we know that a familyW ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions
which is induced by an acceptable aggregation rule is a strong and proper simple
game on N . But for a systematic aggregation rule to be acceptable for an agenda
with at least three propositions, its induced family of winning coalitions also needs
to satisfy the intersecting triple property, and thus, by Monjardet’s lemma, is an
ultrafilter. Finally, as N is finite, W is a principal ultrafilter and thus has the form
{U ⊆ N : i ∈ U} for some i ∈ N – the dictator.
4. HISTORICAL NOTE
We will succesively examine three points: the genesis of Guilbaud’s 1952 paper,
the genesis of Guilbaud’s theorem on judgment aggregation, its relation to Arrow’s
theorem and the origins of the ultrafilter proofs in social choice theory.
Guilbaud’s theorem on judgment aggregation is contained in his paper Les théories
de l’intérêt général et le problème logique de l’agrégation (Theories of the general in-
terest and the logical problem of aggregation). In order to understand the genesis of
this paper we must put together some biographical and scientific facts9. Guilbaud,
after his studies of mathematics at the École Normale Supérieure (1932-1935), was
first teacher of in classes of high mathematics10 at Metz, Brest then Dijon (1941-
1947). From 1942 to 1947 he also did lectures on the philosophy of sciences at the «
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines » of Dijon. Guilbaud was interested in the
use of mathematics in Economics and more generally in Social Sciences. So he read
classics like Condorcet, Cournot or Pareto. Gilles-Gaston Granger comes at Dijon
in 1943 as professor of philosophy and both begin a friendship where in particular
they speak about Condorcet’s « Mathématique Sociale »11. In 1947 Guilbaud be-
comes member of the « Institut des Sciences Économiques Appliquées (ISEA) » of
François Perroux where he works as mathematician, statistician and economist up
8Monjardet [1978] shows that a collection W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N is an ultrafilter if and only
if it satisfies the intersecting triple property and the property that for any U ∈ 2N , U /∈ W ⇒
N\U ∈ W. Observe that for collections which are simple games the latter property defines a strong
simple game.
9Guilbaud died in 2008 and a special issue of Mathématiques et Sciences humaines
183, 2008, contains his biography and his publications (URL: http://www.ehess.fr/revue-
msh/recherche.php?numero=183).
10These classes prepare students for the competitive examinations allowing the entrance
in a « Grande École » like the École Polytechnique or the École Normale Supérieure.
11Granger writes in the introduction of his book La mathématique sociale du marquis de
Condorcet (Paris, 1956) and which was his Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres: « Je
dois à mon collègue et ami G.-Th. Guilbaud, outre des suggestions toujours fécondes, l’idée même
d’étudier Condorcet » (p. x).
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to 1955. Arrow sends him a preprint of his 1951 book Social Choice and Individ-
ual Values. Guilbaud is surprised to see that Arrow doesn’t know that the “voting
paradox” is due to Condorcet. Meanwhile, Arrow is invited by Perroux at the ISEA
to make a presentation of his work. His lecture entitled The rationality principle
in collective decisions is given on June 1952 and is published in a special issue of
Économie appliquée12 devoted to welfare economics and called L’avantage collectif.
Guilbaud’s paper – certainly motivated by Arrow’s coming – is in this same issue.
This paper contains many interesting results and perspectives on aggregation
problems13. In particular, Guilbaud dragged from the deep oblivion where it had
fallen Condorcet’s Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions
rendues à la pluralité des voix (Paris, 1785)14. Indeed, the Essai had been read only
by a few contemporaries including the mathematicians Sylvestre-Francois Lacroix
and Simon Lhuilier or the politician and historian Pierre Claude Francois Daunou.
But later in France reputed mathematicians like Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand in
his Calcul des probabilités (Paris, 1888/89) found the book unreadable and anyway
without interest, an opinion shared by the main 19th century historian of mathe-
matics Isaac Todhunter who at least had read the Essai15. Guilbaud was the first
to read again the Essai and to understand the logical problem raised by Condorcet
through his sometimes enough confuse probabilistic approach.
Indeed, Condorcet’s aim in the Essai is to find the method which maximizes the
probability to get the truth when a collectivity must determine it by a voting proce-
dure. The truth can be the culpability or not of a defendant when the collectivity is a
court or the best candidate when the collectivity is a recruitment jury. In such cases,
the voters must give what Condorcet calls an opinion (« avis ») on the decision to
take. According to Condorcet this opinion can and must always be decomposed in
a sequence of answers TRUE or FALSE to binary propositions (equivalently, in a
sequence of answers YES or NO to binary questions)16. For instance, in the case of
candidates, the opinion of a voter can be a (strict) ranking of the candidates and it
is decomposed in a sequence of answers to the questions: is candidate A better than
candidate B? Now, Condorcet argues that the collective decision must be obtained
by taking the opinion resulting of the majority decisions obtained on each question.
And he shows a first “paradox”: this opinion is not necessarily the opinion obtained
by the “plurality” (i.e. the opinion obtaining the greatest number of votes). In fact
« en prenant la décision à la pluralité entre les avis à la manière ordinaire, on pour-
rait adopter l’avis de la minorité » (“by taking the decision between the opinions
by the usual plurality method, it would be possible to adopt the minority opinion”,
12Économie appliquée 5(4): 469-484 (October-December 1952).
13An analysis of this paper can be found in [Monjardet, 2005].
14For a partial english translation with an introduction into Condorcet’s work see [Condorcet,
1994].
15In his book A history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of Pascal to that
of Laplace (London, 1865) Todhunter devotes a chapter to a detailed analysis of the Essai but he
completely misses the significance of Condorcet’s study on the systems of propositions and their
possible contradictions (“these results however appear of too little value to detain us any longer”,
p. 375).
16Condorcet’s formulation is : « chaque avis est une combinaison de propositions simples et de
leurs contradictoires » (Essai, Discours préliminaire, p. 45).
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Essai, p. 115). On the other hand, Condorcet observes that the propositions can be
linked like in the following example where they are incompatible (Essai, Discours
préliminaire, p. 50-51): the first proposition is p = « il est prouvé que l’accusé est
coupable » and the second is q = « il est prouvé que l’accusé est innocent ». Now,
Condorcet assumes that there are 11 opinions ‘p and nonq’, 7 opinions ‘nonp and q’
and 6 opinions ‘nonp and nonq’. In this case the opinion having the plurality is ‘p
and nonq’, whereas the opinion obtained by using the majority rule on each of the
two propositions is ‘nonp and nonq’.
In the case of preferences agregation Condorcet’s majority method used on each
pairwise comparison between two alternatives leads him to discover the “Condorcet
effect” (the paradox of voting): the binary majority preferences do not necessarily
yield a ranking, they may lead to a cycle. Now, Guilbaud observes that the prob-
lem is more general and has been already encountered for instance in the case of
Quetelet’s « homme moyen »17. The problem occurs each time that one applies –
like Condorcet – a component-wise method of aggregation of complex objects. It
consists first of decomposing complex objects into their simple elements, then of
applying to each series of such elements an aggregation operator like the mean or
the median (the majority rule comes back to take a median). By definition an es-
sential property of this method is its property of independence: each series of simple
elements is aggregated (by the same or by different operators) independently of the
other series. Now as soon as the complex objects considered satisfy some relations
between their simple elements, the aggregated complex object does not necessarily
satisfy these same relations.18 In the case of preference aggregation, Arrow proved
that the apparition of Condorcet effects is unavoidable in the sense that in order
to avoid it one must take a “dictatorial” aggregation procedure or sacrify another
desirable property of the aggregation rule. It is certainly the reading of the Essai
and of Arrow’s result that motivated Guilbaud to consider a more general frame-
work and then to get his dictatorship result on the aggregation of valuations for a
set of propositions. However, Guilbaud does not make the claim that his theorem
is stronger than Arrow’s. In fact, he is well aware that his joint assumption of in-
dependence and neutrality is stronger than the Arrovian independence condition,
and makes much effort to justify it. But above all, his acceptability condition is
even the strongest possible domain condition19 and thus much stronger than the
Arrovian condition of universal domain which is still restricted to preferences, i.e.
to the particular subdomain of admissible valuations for pairwise rankings between
alternatives in the case of weak orderings.
On the other hand, Arrow acknowledged Guilbaud’s 1952 paper as a “remarkable
exposition of the theory of collective choice and the general problem of aggregation”
in the second edition of his book [Arrow, 1963, p. 92]. He even seemed ready to
17See Guilbaud’s paper or [Monjardet, 2005] for details.
18One can observe that it is exactly this situation which happens in the so-called “doctrinal
paradox” (see the following section). Here one has several propositions logically linked and that
judges – respecting these links – can find true or false. But when one takes the majority answers
to each proposition it is possible to get a result not satisfying the logical links.
19In fact, it is possible to strengthen significantly Guilbaud’s theorem by considerably weakening
his acceptability condition as we will show in a forthcoming paper.
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consider the pairwise acceptability condition in lemma 1 as a relaxation of his weak
ordering requirement of collective rationality, as the following quotation suggests:
“Guilbaud weakens the condition [of Collective Rationality] to require simply avoid-
ing contradictions on two successive decisions (rather than three, when the full force
of transitivity comes into play). He then conducts the bulk of his analysis under
the assumption that the decision rule between any two alternatives be the same”
[Arrow, 1962, p. 100].
This quotation could let think that one can deduce Arrow’s theorem from Guil-
baud’s theorem, what is untrue. But, what is true is that one can use Guilbaud’s
method of proof to get short proofs of Arrow’s theorem [Monjardet, 1969, 1978,
2003].
In the proof of his theorem Guilbaud does not use the term ultrafilter. But it
suffices to read his proof to see that “followers of Bourbaki will notice an ultrafilter
in the background” as Blau [1979, p. 202] would have said and as it was observed
by Monjardet [1969, p. 180]: « Il est alors immédiat que dans l’algèbre de Boole des
parties de N, la famille [des ensembles décisifs] doit être un filtre maximal » (“then it
is immediate that in the Boolean algebra of subsets of N, the family [of decisive sets]
must be a maximal filter”). In handwritten notes concerning his 1952 paper sent to
one of us Guilbaud explains: “I could have pointed out Henri Cartan’s filters20. But
firstly I have found this allusion too pompous and secondly for Cartan the filters
were a mean to get rid of ’the plague of countable’. So, it concerns essentially the
infinite, what was out of the topic.”
It is interesting to observe that the rediscovery of the use of ultrafilter in the
proof of Arrow’s theorem occured precisely after that Fishburn [1970] noticed that
the dictatorship result does not hold in the case of an infinite population of voters
(assuming the Axiom of Choice): Then Hansson [1976] in a paper written in 1971,
and Kirman and Sondermann [1972] gave an ultrafilter proof of Arrow’s theorem
by showing that the collection of decisive coalitions induced by a social welfare
function satisfying Arrow’s other axioms is an ultrafilter. The dictatorship result
then immediately follows from the well-known fact that an ultrafilter on a finite set is
principal, i.e. the collection of all supersets of some singleton. After this rediscovery
ultrafilter proofs were often used for impossibility (or possibility) theorems in social
choice theory and in the recent literature on judgment aggregation.
5. JUDGEMENT AGGREGATION AND GUILBAUD’S THEOREM
Interestingly, the recent literature on judgment aggregation originates in a paradox
which arises in the same legal context of aggregating the opinions of a court of
several judges into a collective decision that motivated Condorcet’s analysis: the
doctrinal paradox [Kornhauser, Sager, 1986]. This paradox owes its name to the
logical connections between the issues established by legal doctrine: In particular,
in a contract case a defendant is liable (L) if and only if there was a valid contract
20Henri Cartan was the creator of the notion of filter. See his two 1937 Comptes rendus à
l’Académie des Sciences de Paris, « Théorie des filtres » (205, p. 595-598) and « Filtres et
ultrafiltres » (205, p. 777-779).
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(C) and a material breach (B) of that contract. Thus, the verdict L is equivalent
to the conjunction of two propositions.
How easily majority voting can lead to a logically inconsistent outcome is seen
from the following table21:
C B L
Judge 1 1 1 1
Judge 2 0 1 0
Judge 3 1 0 0
Court 1 1 0
In fact, the first theorem in the literature on judgment aggregation by List and
Pettit [2002] is a straightforward generalization of the doctrinal paradox. This theo-
rem was originally not formulated in the framework of binary valuations, but of the
aggregation of judgment sets and uses the stronger property of anonymity instead
of non-dictatorship22.
theorem 2 (List, Pettit, 2002). If for two atomic propositions pk, pl the set
{pk,¬pk, pl,¬pl, pk ∧ pl,¬(pk ∧ pl)} is a subset of the agenda P (where ∧ could be
replaced by ∨ or →), there exists no systematic and anonymous aggregation rule
f : XN → {0, 1}P such that the subdomain X ⊆ {0, 1}P of admissible valuations of
the agenda P is closed.
Observe that an equivalent formulation of Guilbaud’s theorem is that there exists
no systematic and non-dictatorial aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P under
which the subdomain X ⊆ {0, 1}P of admissible valuations for any agenda P is
closed.
Although the non-dictatorship property used by Guilbaud is weaker than the
property of anonymity used in List and Pettit’s impossibility theorem, Guilbaud’s
theorem cannot be considered to be stronger, because his acceptability condition is
the strongest possible agenda condition: it requires the closure of the subdomain of
admissible valuations for any agenda.
Thus the significance of Guilbaud’s theorem does not consist in the strength of
the result, but in the strength and originality of his approach: Long before Wil-
son [1975, p. 89] asked the question “whether procedures for aggregating attributes
other than preferences are subject to similar restrictions” than Arrow’s theorem,
which initiated the literature on abstract aggregation theory, and even longer before
the recent literature on judgment aggregation Guilbaud generalized Arrow’s theo-
rem to the “logical problem of aggregation”. Like Rubinstein and Fishburn [1986]
21In fact, the legal literature on the doctrinal paradox was more interested in the discrepancy
between the outcome of majority voting on the premises and the outcome of majority voting on
the conclusion.
22For the below reformulation of this theorem in the framework of propositional valuations (as
well as for a generalization of it) see Pauly and van Hees [2006]. The properties of completeness,
consistency, and deductive closure defined for individual and collective judgment sets, i.e. subsets
of a set P of propositions then directly translate into the condition that the domain of admissible
valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}P be closed under the aggregation rule.
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for abstract aggregation theory and later Dokow and Holzman [2010] for judgment
aggregation he formulated this problem in an algebraic framework. But above all,
he addressed this problem with the powerful tools of ultrafilters long before they
were even used in the theory of preference aggregation.
A classical escape route from Arrovian impossibility results consists in domain
restrictions. For particular domain restrictions it can be shown that majority rule
never induces a “Condorcet effect”. Dietrich and List [2010] provide several domain
restrictions that guarantee logically consistent judgments under majority rule. In
particular, they show that one can get such domains when the (set of propositions
of the) agenda is linearly ordered. This result is similar to Black’s single-peakedness
condition in preference aggregation. In his paper, Guilbaud devotes several pages
(540ff/26ff) to a study of this last condition. He shows that this comes back to
define a (partial) order on the set of the pairwise comparisons x > y and that the
linear orders satisfying Black’s condition correspond to the up-sets of this order. So
by Birkhoff’s duality between posets and distributive lattices the set of these linear
orders is a distributive lattice. But since (as it is or it should be well-known that)
majority rule coincides with the median operation in a distributive lattice, the set of
these linear orders is closed under majority rule.23 In this way, Guilbaud’s remarks
on Black’s condition also anticipated the main domain restriction in preference ag-
gregation. Indeed, almost all restricted domains are distributive lattices defined
from particular partial orders on the pairwise comparisons [Galambos, Reiner, 2008;
Monjardet, 2008(b)]. Moreover, it is easy to see that Guilbaud’s observation can
be extended to judgment aggregation. As soon as there exists a partial order on
the agenda, the set of admissible valuations corresponds to the distributive lattice
of the down-sets of this poset and then majority rule always provides an admissible
valuation.
6. CONCLUSION
In 1952, almost immediately after the publication of Arrow’s seminal book in 1951,
the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud published an article in a spe-
cial issue of the French review Économie Appliquée dedicated to welfare economics
which anticipated both the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory and the more
recent attempts to extend this area from the theory of preference aggregation to
abstract aggregation theory and judgment aggregation in particular. This article
published in French remained almost unnoticed, although Arrow himself acknowl-
edged it as a “remarkable exposition of the theory of collective choice and the general
problem of aggregation” in the second edition of his book [Arrow, 1963, p. 92]. This
phenomenon deserves further investigation as a case of multiple discoveries due to
language barriers24, but interestingly not even a partial translation of this article in
1966 was able to attract due attention25. This might be seen as evidence for deeper
23See, for instance, [Hudry et al., 2009] for the link between majority rule and the median
operation in distributive lattices.
24For the significance and examples of language barriers in multiple discoveries in economics see
Niehans [1995].
25The paper was sometimes quoted (for instance in [Gehrlein, Fishburn, 1978]) for a (marginal)
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barriers impeding scientific communication even in highly formalized areas of the
social sciences.
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